Bartel v. Debry : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Bartel v. Debry : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Del K. Bartel; Appellant Pro Se; Dale Thurgood; Appellant Pro Se.
John A. Anderson; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; D. Gary Christian; Heinz J. Mahler;
Kipp & Christian; Blake Atkin; Atkin & Lilja; Craig R. Mariger; Rob M. Alston; Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook & McDonough; Paul M. Belnap; Robert L. Janicki; Strong & Hanni; Craig C. Coburn;
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Bartel v. Debry, No. 960753 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/536
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEL K. BARTEL, individually, 
and as to his individual interest 
in CASCADE ENTERPRISES and 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, and DALE 
THURGOOD, individually and as to 
his individual interest in 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES and 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, JOAN DEBRY, 
ROBERT J. DEBRY AND ASSOCIATES, 
EDWARD T. WELLS, DALE GARDINER, 
KENNETH W. KARREN, KENNETH 
W. KARREN, JR., GEORGE R. JENSEN, 
MICHAEL JENSEN, DAVID JORGENSEN, 
JAMES BAILEY, DAVID MU, WILLIAM 
F. BANNON, MICHAEL MILLS, VALLEY 
MORTGAGE COMPANY and JOHN DOES 
1 through 9 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
DALE GARDINER 
Court of Appeals No. 960753 
Priority No. 15 
RESPONSE TO APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, IN 
CIVIL NO. 920903507-CV 
Del K. Bartel 
P.O. Box 57234 
Murray, Utah 84157 
Pro Se Appellant 
Dale Thurgood 
190 South 350 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Pro Se Appellant 
Blake S. Atkin 
Scott M. Lilja 
Jonathan L. Hawkins 
Robert G. Johnson 
ATKIN & LILJA, P.C. 
136 South Main, Suite 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Dale Gardiner 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEL K. BARTEL, individually, 
and as to his individual interest 
in CASCADE ENTERPRISES and 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, and DALE 
THURGOOD, individually and as to 
his individual interest in 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES and 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, JOAN DEBRY, 
ROBERT J. DEBRY AND ASSOCIATES, 
EDWARD T. WELLS, DALE GARDINER, 
KENNETH W. KARREN, KENNETH 
W. KARREN, JR., GEORGE R. JENSEN, 
MICHAEL JENSEN, DAVID JORGENSEN, 
JAMES BAILEY, DAVID MU, WILLIAM 
F. BANNON, MICHAEL MILLS, VALLEY 
MORTGAGE COMPANY and JOHN DOES 
1 through 9, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
DALE GARDINER 
Court of Appeals No. 960753 
Priority No. 15 
RESPONSE TO APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, IN 
CIVIL NO. 920903507-CV 
Del K. Bartel 
P.O. Box 57234 
Murray, Utah 84157 
Pro Se Appellant 
Dale Thurgood 
190 South 350 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Pro Se Appellant 
Blake S. Atkin 
Scott M. Lilja 
Jonathan L. Hawkins 
Robert G. Johnson 
ATKIN & LILJA, P.C. 
136 South Main, Suite 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Dale Gardiner 
John A. Anderson 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Appellees Robert J. 
and Joan DeBry 
D. Gary Christian 
Heinz J. Mahler 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
175 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellees Edward T. 
Wells and Robert J. DeBry & 
Associates 
Craig R. Mariger 
Rob M. Alston 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellees Kenneth W. 
Karren and Kenneth W. Karren, Jr. 
Paul M. Belnap 
Robert L. Janicki 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellee David Jorgensen 
Craig C. Coburn 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2456 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Appellees James Bailey 
and David Mu 
i. LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BEING APPEALED. 
The parties ta the lower court proceedings which are involved in 
this appeal are as follows: 
Name 
Del K. Bartel 
Dale Thurgood 
Robert J. DeBry 
Joan DeBry 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
Edward T. Wells 
Dale Gardiner 
Kenneth W. Karren 
Kenneth W. Karren, Jr. 
James Bailey 
David Mu 
David Jorden 
Status (Lower Court/Appeal) 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
Defendant/Appellee 
Defendant/Appellee 
Defendant/Appellee 
Defendant/Appellee 
Defendant/Appellee 
Defendant/Appellee 
Defendant/Appellee 
Defendant/Appellee 
Defendant/Appellee 
Defendant/Appellee 
The parties to the lower court proceedings which are not involved 
in this appeal are as follows: 
Name Status In Prior Proceeding 
Lee Bartel Plaintiff 
George R. Jensen Defendant 
Michael Jensen Defendant 
William F. Bannon Defendant 
Michael Mills Defendant 
Valley Mortgage Corporation Defendant 
ii. TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BEING APPEALED. i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. V 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 2 
NATURE OF THE CASE. 2 
THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. 3 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS. 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 11 
ARGUMENTS. '.'."'.' 13 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF SHOULD BE DISREGARDED OR 
STRICKEN BECAUSE OF THEIR FAILURE TO COMPLY 
WITH RULE 24 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE AND THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
ATTORNEY GARDINER SHOULD BE SUMMARILY AFFIRMED. 13 
APPELLANTS' UNTIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL FAILED 
TO VEST JURISDICTION IN THIS COURT AND THE APPEAL 
SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED. 16 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF ATTORNEY GARDINER ON EACH OF THE 
EIGHT (8) CAUSES OF ACTION ASSERTED AGAINST 
HIM IN THE TRIAL COURT. 18 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED 
IN FAVOR OF ATTORNEY GARDINER ON 
APPELLANTS' FIFTH AND TWENTY-SECOND CAUSES 
OF ACTION FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS. 21 
Appellants' Abuse Of Process Claim 
Fails As The Underlying Lawsuit Did 
Not Terminate In Their Favor. 22 
ii 
Appellants' Abuse Of Process Claim Also 
Fails As The Undisputed Evidence Conclusively 
Establishes That Attorney Gardiner Represented 
The DeBrys Only During A Narrow Window And The 
Wrongs Alleged Against Him Constitute Nothing 
More Than A Zealous Representation Of His 
Client And Were Not Improper. 23 
Attorney Gardiner's Actions In 
Connection With The Federal Lawsuit 
Were Proper. 24 
Appellants' Allegations That 
Attorney Gardiner Refused To 
Allow Re-Cross Examination Of 
Mrs. DeBry Do Not Constitute 
Abuse Of Process. 25 
Appellants' Claim That Attorney 
Gardiner Unsuccessfully Attempted 
To Recuse Judge Brian Is Not 
Abuse Of Process. 27 
Attorney Gardiner's Forced Withdrawal 
As Counsel For The DeBrys Does Not And 
Cannot Constitute Abuse Of Process. . . . . 27 
Appellants' Allegations Regarding 
Attorney Gardiner's "Hiding, Losing 
and Destroying" Documents Did Not 
Create An Abuse Of Process. 29 
Appellants' Abuse of Process Claim Based On 
Purported Procedural Improprieties Cannot, 
As A Matter Of Law, Be Pursued In A 
Collateral Action And Attorney Gardiner Is 
Entitled To Judgment In His Favor. 30 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR 
OF ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS' "CONSPIRACY" 
(TENTH) CAUSE OF ACTION. 31 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR 
OF ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS' ELEVENTH 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR "TORTIOUS CONDUCT, 
INTERFERENCE, AND PRIMA FACIE TORT." 35 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR 
OF ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS' TWELFTH 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CIVIL EXTORTION AND COERCION. . . 36 
iii 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR 
OF ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS' TWENTY-SECOND 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE. 36 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR 
OF ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS' TWENTY-FOURTH 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. . 38 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR 
OF ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS' THIRTY-SECOND 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR "CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES." . . . . 39 
TO THE EXTENT THEY SEEK TO DO SO, APPELLANTS CANNOT 
PURSUE A CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM AGAINST ATTORNEY GARDINER 
AS HE WOULD BE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON SUCH CLAIM AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 39 
RELIEF SOUGHT. 40 
NO ADDENDUM IS NECESSARY. 41 
iv 
iii. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. 
A. CASES. 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) 14, 21 
Barnard v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188 
(10th Cir. 1983) 26, 27, 30, 31, 40 
Bird v. Rothman, 627 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), 
cert, denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981) 37-38 
Boisiolv v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F.Supp. 795 
(D. Utah 1988) 38 
Brown v. Reardon, 770 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1985) 19-20 
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) 18-19 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) . . . . . . 19 
Citizen State Bank v. Gilmore, 603 P.2d 605 (Kan. 1979) . . . . 31 
Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 30 Utah 2d 451, 
519 P.2d 888 (1974) 21 
DeBrv v. Cascade Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1353 
(Utah 1994) 10, 22, 23, 35, 37 
English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) 15 
F r a n k l i n F i n , v . New Empire Dev. C o . , 659 P .2d 1040 
(Utah 1983) 20 
General Time Corp. v. Padua Alarm Sys., 199 F.2d 351 
(2d Cir. 1952) 18 
Glezos v. Frontier Inv. , 896 P.2d 1230 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) 1, 18 
Holcomb v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 774 F.2d 398 
(10th Cir. 1985) 18 
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) 31, 32, 34 
v 
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) 40 
Rinqvood v. Foreign Auto Work. Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) 26, 27, 29, 31, 33, 34 
Saroms v. Eccles. 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961) 28, 39 
Sandidge v. Salen Offshore Drilling Co.f 764 F.2d 252 
(5th Cir. 1985) 17 
Schafir v. Harrigan. 879 P.2d 1384 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) 5, 20 
Sepia Enters.. Inc. v. City of Toledo. 462 F.2d 115 
(6th Cir. 1972) 17 
State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 15 
State v. Montova. 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 1, 18 
State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) . . . .14, 15-16 
State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 14, 15 
Steele v. Board of Review of Indus. Conun'nf 845 P.2d 960 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) 15 
Tappen v. Acer. 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979) 37 
Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120 
(Utah 1994) 25-26, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34 
Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) 20 
Trees v. Lewis. 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987) 14 
TS 1 Partnership v. Allred. 877 P.2d 156 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) 20 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) 15 
White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . . 38, 39 
vi 
B. RULES OF PROCEDURE, 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) 17, 18 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 14, 16, 40 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)
 f . . 13 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c)
 ¥ . • 16 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(j)
 ¥ . . 13 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11 ^ . . 30 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37
 f 29, 30 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)
 ¥ . . 18 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)
 f . . 19 
C. SECONDARY AUTHORITIES, 
Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) 36 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674(b) (1976)
 K . . 21 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 (1976) . . . . . . . ^ .. 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1996) , . . 22 
vii 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. 
This Court lacks jurisdiction of this matter as Appellants1 
Notice of Appeal was untimely filed. Appellants1 Notice of Appeal 
was not filed until October 27, 1995, more than 100 days after the 
trial court's July 10, 1995 Orders disposing of all claims. 
Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. E.g., 
State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (time for filing 
an appeal is jurisdictional); Glezos v. Frontier Inv., 896 P.2d 
1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
cross-appeal that was not timely filed). This argument is more 
fully set forth infra, at section VLB, pp. 16-18.1 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
The following issues are presented for appeal with respect to 
Appellee Attorney Dale Gardiner: 
1. Should this Court disregard or strike Appellants1 Brief 
for its blatant failure to comply with Rule 24, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, and summarily affirm the Judgment by the trial 
court? 
2. Does this Court lack jurisdiction over this appeal as a 
result of Appellants' filing of their Notice of Appeal more than 
100 days after the trial court's orders disposing of all claims? 
1
 Moreover, the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal is 
the basis of Appellee Dale Gardiner's Motion for Summary 
Disposition filed December 11, 1995, and that motion is 
incorporated herein by reference. The Utah Supreme Court has 
deferred ruling on this Motion pending further consideration. See 
March 20, 1996 Order, signed by Associate Chief Justice I. Daniel 
Stewart. 
3, Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment on 
Appellants1 claims for abuse of process, conspiracy, interference, 
civil extortion and coercion, negligence, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and consequential damages asserted against 
Attorney Gardiner when the undisputed evidence shows that Attorney 
Gardiner did not file the complaint, was forced by a conflict of 
interest to withdraw before trial, and took no actions except those 
allowed under the Rules of Civil Procedure during the window in 
which he represented Appellants1 adversaries? 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS. 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of this 
appeal. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Appellants were opposing parties in prior lawsuits brought by 
Attorney Gardiner's former clients, Appellees Robert J. and Joan 
DeBry, in the Third Judicial District Court and the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah. More than a year after 
the actions were commenced, Attorney Gardiner entered his 
appearances on behalf of the DeBrys. He represented the DeBrys 
until August 31, 1989 when a conflict of interest arising out of a 
pending divorce between the DeBrys necessitated his withdrawal. 
The Third District Court litigation was eventually resolved, in 
part by stipulation and in part by litigation. In that litigation, 
2 
Appellants prevailed on some claims, and the Appellee DeBrys 
prevailed on some. The Federal Court litigation was eventually 
dismissed as a result of the resolution of the Third District Court 
lawsuit. 
Thereafter, Appellants brought this multi-claim action against 
numerous parties, including Attorney Gardiner. In their 80-page 
unverified complaint, which contained more than 450 allegations, 
Appellants asserted the following causes of action against Attorney 
Gardiner: 
Fifth: Abuse of Process 
Tenth: Conspiracy 
Eleventh: Interference 
Twelfth: Civil Extortion and Coercion 
Twenty Second: Negligence 
Twenty Third: Abuse of Process 
Twenty Fourth: Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress 
Thirty Second: Consequential Damages 
Appellants1 claims against Attorney Gardiner all relate to 
procedural actions he took on behalf of his clients in the 
litigation during the window Attorney Gardiner acted as the lawyer 
for Appellants' adversaries. 
B. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. 
1. On March 20, 1995, Appellants filed their Consolidated 
Amended Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. [Record 2726-2805].2 
2
 All citations, unless otherwise noted, are to the 
original record index of District Court No. 920903507, Supreme 
Court No. 960066, as paginated pursuant to 11(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure and filed with the Utah Supreme Court on 
April 29, 1996. 
3 
2. On March 30, 1995, Appellee Gardiner filed a "Motion to 
Dismiss, Or In The Alternative For Summary Judgment On, Plaintiffs1 
Consolidated Amended Complaint,w and supporting memorandum.3 
[Record 2839-2842 & 2847-2964, respectively]. 
3. Appellants submitted a response and Appellee Gardiner 
filed a reply. [Record 3167-3179 & 3384-3443, respectively]. 
Thereafter, Appellants filed an additional pleading captioned 
"Plaintiffs [sic] Supplemental Citations In Support Of Response In 
Opposition To Defendant's Motions To Dismiss And For Summary 
Judgment.ff [Record 3474-3477]. 
4. On April 26, 1995, the Third Judicial District Court, 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, orally granted the motions to dismiss 
and for summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all claims 
in this proceeding with the exception of the claims against Valley 
Mortgage Company. [Record 3482]. 
5. On July 10, 1995, Judge Wilkinson, entered Orders: 
a) memorializing his prior granting of Attorney 
Gardiner• s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dismissing with prejudice all causes of 
action asserted against Attorney Gardiner; 
b) memorializing his prior granting of Appellees 
Robert J. DeBry, Robert J. Debry & Associates, and 
Edward T. Wells1 Motions to Dismiss, dismissing 
with prejudice all causes of action asserted 
3
 Appellees Robert J. Debry, Robert J. DeBry & Associates, 
and Edward T. Wells also filed motions to dismiss or, in the 
alternative, for summary judgment. 
4 
against them; and 
c) continuing the trial date as to Valley Mortgage to 
allow Appellants to proceed with the filing of an 
appeal of the "court's final order of April 26, 
1995." 
[Record 3543-3549, 3551-3557 & 3558-3560]. 
6. On October 17, 1995, Appellants filed their Notice of 
Appeal in this action. [Record 3588-3590]. 
7. On December 11, 1995, Attorney Gardiner filed a Motion 
for Summary Disposition of this Appeal with this Court on the basis 
that the Notice of Appeal was filed too late for the appellate 
court to obtain jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court, by Order 
dated March 20, 1996, has deferred ruling on the Motion for Summary 
Disposition until further consideration. 
C. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS. 
The relevant facts set forth herein are undisputed as the 
Appellants failed to set forth any evidence pursuant to Rule 56, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to counter the evidence established 
by Attorney Gardiner in support of his motion for summary judgment. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, these facts are not in dispute. 
E.g. , Schafir v. Harriqan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994); see also, infra, section VI.C at pp. 18-20. 
1. On January 24, 1986, Robert J. DeBry and Joan Debry (the 
"DeBrys") filed an action styled Robert J. Debry and Joan DeBry, 
Plaintiffs v. Cascade Enterprises, et al.. Defendants, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, Civil No. 860900553, before 
5 
the Honorable Pat B. Brian (the "Underlying Lawsuit"). rE.g. , 
Record 2850 at f 1J. 
2. In the Underlying Lawsuit, the DeBrys sought to recover 
for defects in construction of an office building purchased by the 
Debrys from, among others, Cascade Enterprises, Cascade 
Construction, and Appellants Del K. Bartel and Dale Thurgood. 
[E.g.» Record 2850 at f 2]. 
3. Appellants Bartel and Thurgood filed counterclaims 
against the DeBrys in the Underlying Lawsuit. rE.g., Record 2850 
at 1 3]. 
4. Attorney Gardiner did not file the complaint in the 
Underlying Lawsuit. In fact, Attorney Gardiner did not become an 
employee of Robert J. DeBry & Associates until July, 1987 and did 
not make an entry of appearance in the Underlying Lawsuit on behalf 
of the DeBrys until July 31, 1987 — more than a year after the 
action was commenced. [Record 2850-2851; 2878-2880; 2895 at 5f 2 
& 3] . 
5. Pursuant to a scheduling conference held on August 19, 
1988, Judge Brian set May 1, 1989 as the discovery cut-off date in 
the Underlying Lawsuit. [Record 2851 at J 5]. 
6. As an accommodation, however, Attorney Gardiner allowed 
Fidelity National Title to take the deposition of his client, Joan 
DeBry, after this discovery cut-off date. [Record 2851 at J 6]. 
7. At the time this deposition was conducted by Fidelity 
National Title, the Appellants had already taken and completed 
their deposition of Joan Debry. [Record 2851 at 5 7; 2881-2884]. 
6 
8. The DeBrys filed a complaint against the Plaintiff in 
Federal District Court on February, 1989 under case No. 89C-1811W 
(the "Federal Lawsuit"). Attorney Gardiner did not file the 
Federal Lawsuit. [Record 2851 at 5 10; 2894-2898 at J 5]. 
9. On March 21, 1989 the Appellants filed a motion to 
dismiss the Federal Lawsuit which was opposed by Attorney Gardiner 
as counsel for the DeBrys. [Record 2852 at f 11]. 
10. The Federal District Court denied Appellants1 motion to 
dismiss the federal civil rights claim by order dated May 25, 1989. 
[Record 2852 at J 12; 2899-2900]. Attorney Gardiner, on behalf of 
the DeBrys, then stipulated to the dismissal without prejudice of 
the related state court claims. This dismissal of the related 
state court claims was agreed to by the DeBrys because those claims 
were pending in another forum, not because such claims lacked 
merit. [Record 2852 at 1 12; 2894-2898 at f 7; 2901-2910]. 
11. During the course of the Underlying Litigation, Attorney 
Gardiner filed a request that Judge Brian recuse himself from 
presiding over the lawsuit or, in the alternative, that he be 
disqualified from presiding over the lawsuit. That motion was 
heard by Judge Daniels who denied the motion. Thereafter, 
Appellants1 motion for Rule 11 sanctions based on the Motion to 
Disqualify was heard by Judge Daniels. The hearing on that motion 
for Rule 11 sanctions was held on August 21, 1989. The judge 
denied any Rule 11 sanctions finding that there was a sufficient 
basis for bringing the motion. [Record 2894-2898 at f 13]. 
12. Pursuant to an order of the Third District Court 
7 
effective August 31, 1989, Gardiner was forced to withdraw as 
counsel for the DeBrys due to a conflict of interest arising out of 
a pending divorce proceeding between Robert and Joan DeBry. 
[Record 2851 at ? 8; 2885-2888].* 
13. In December, 1989 the DeBrys filed a second lawsuit 
against Appellants Bartel and Thurgood in the Third District Court 
under case no. 890907449CV. Gardiner had terminated his employ 
with Robert DeBry & Associates prior to this time and had no 
involvement in that lawsuit. [Record 2852 at 1 13; 2894-2898 at 
1 10]. 
14. On or about February 28, 1990 and after Attorney 
Gardiner's withdrawal as counsel, the Underlying Lawsuit came on 
for a bifurcated trial only as to the Appellants, Tri-K 
construction and Sherwin Knudsen (collectively "Tri-K"); and Geneva 
Rock Products. [Record 2852 at 1 14; 2911-2917]. 
15. On that day, Appellants and Tri-K reached a settlement on 
a major aspect of the case. DeBrys and Appellants also entered 
into a settlement stipulation regarding that major aspect of the 
case on that day. [Record 2852 at 5 14]. 
16. Judge Brian executed an Order approving the Tri-K 
settlement and the stipulation between the DeBrys and the 
Appellants on April 17, 1990. [Record 2853 at ? 16; 2911-2917]. 
17. The trial of the remaining issues between the DeBrys and 
4
 The DeBrys subsequently divorced and due to a stipulation 
entered into in connection with the divorce wherein Robert DeBry 
agreed to indemnify Joan, the DeBrys were able to proceed with 
common representation. [Record 2851 at f 9; 2866; 2889-2993]. 
8 
the Cascade parties (which included Appellants) in the Underlying 
Lawsuit commenced on May 21, 1990 and continued intermittently 
until the jury returned its special verdict on June 20, 1990. 
[Record 2853 at f 17; 2918-2932]. 
18. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of the 
DeBrys on some claims and in favor of the Appellants on other 
claims. [Record 2853 at 5 18; 2918-2932]. 
19. Thereafter, the DeBrys and Appellants filed various post-
trial motions which were denied in part and granted in part 
pursuant to an Order dated March 28, 1991. [Record 2853 at J 19; 
2933-2934]. 
20. On June 4, 1991, Judge Brian entered a Judgment on the 
Jury's Special Verdict. [Record 2853 at 1 20; 2918-2932]. 
21. In his Judgment, Judge Brian specifically found that 
11
 [t]here is no prevailing party." [Record 2853 at f 21; 2918-2932 
at p. 14]. 
22. Thereafter, both the DeBrys and the Appellants filed 
appeals from that Judgment. [Record 2853 at f 22]. 
23. On August 21, 1991, two years after Attorney Gardiner's 
withdrawal as counsel for the DeBrys, the Federal Lawsuit was 
dismissed on the grounds that the trial court's decision in the 
Underlying Lawsuit was res judicata. [Record 2853-2854 at 5 23]. 
24. Appellants commenced the consolidated actions which are 
the basis for the instant appeal by filing complaints on or about 
June 19, 1992 and June 22, 1992. [Record 2854 at I 24, 1-72; 2-59 
(of Dist. Ct. No. 920903543)]. Appellants filed amended complaints 
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in both actions on July 13, 1992 and August 20, 1992. [Record 2854 
at 5 24, 73-151; 60-116 (of Dist. Ct. No. 920903543)]. 
25. The District Court granted Robert J. DeBry's motion to 
dismiss Appellants1 claim for active interference and conspiracy to 
commit fraud in March, 1993. An order memorializing the court!s 
decision was not signed and entered at that time. [Record 2854 at 
1 25]. 
26. On July 1, 1994, the Utah Supreme Court rendered its 
decision on appeal of the Underlying Lawsuit in DeBry v. Cascade 
Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1994). Petitions for rehearing 
were denied on August 18, 1994. [Record 2854 at J 26; 2935-2954]. 
27. The Utah Supreme Court»s decision generally upheld the 
damage awards determined by the jury (with some modifications in 
amount). The Court, however, specifically found that the 
Appellants did not prove the elements of either an action for fraud 
or an action for conspiracy to defraud, and therefore vacated the 
punitive damage award. DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1358-1359. [Record 2854 
at f 27; 2935-2954]. 
28. On March 20, 1995, the Appellants filed their unverified 
Consolidated and Amended Complaint in this action. [Record 2726-
2805]. Attorney Gardiner, among others, filed a Motion to Dismiss, 
Or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, on Appellants1 
Consolidated Amended Complaint. [Record 2839-2842]. 
29. On April 26, 1995 the trial court ordered from the bench 
dismissal of all of Appellants1 claims against all defendants 
except Valley Mortgage. [Record 3482]. 
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30. On July 20, 1995, Judge Wilkinson entered his Order 
dismissing Appellants' Complaint against Attorney Gardiner in its 
entirety. [Record 3543-3549]. 
31. On July 10, 1995 the trial court entered its Order 
dismissing all claims against all other defendants except Valley 
Mortgage. [Record 3550; 3551-3557; 3558-3560]. 
32. On July 10, 1995 the trial court entered its Order 
disposing of the claims of Valley Mortgage by continuing the trial 
on those claims w[p]rovided that [Appellants] proceed with the 
filing of appeal of the Court's final Order of April 26, 1995, 
concerning dismissal and summary judgments granted to specific 
named defendants." [Record 3558-3560]. 
33. Appellants did not file their Notice of Appeal until 
October 27, 1995, more than 100 days after the trial court's July 
10, 1995 Orders disposing of all claims as to all parties. [Record 
3588-3590] . 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 
Summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Attorney 
Gardiner on all of the causes of actions asserted against him by 
Appellants, opposing litigants to Attorney Gardiner's former 
clients. There are several independent bases upon which the trial 
court's judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner should be affirmed. 
First, the judgment should be summarily affirmed on the 
grounds that Appellants' Brief utterly fails to comply with Rule 24 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. These severe 
deficiencies, including the complete lack of any meaningful 
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analysis of the law, place Attorney Gardiner at a severe 
disadvantage in responding to Appellants1 assertions. Moreover, it 
is a waste of this Courtfs time and resources. Accordingly, the 
Appellants1 Brief should be stricken or, in the least, disregarded 
and the judgment of the lower court affirmed. 
Second, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal as 
a result of the Appellants1 untimely filing of their Notice of 
Appeal. The Notice of Appeal was not filed for more than 100 days 
after the trial court fs simultaneous entry of several orders which 
disposed of all claims and which were, by their very terms, final 
orders. Accordingly, this appeal should be dismissed and the 
judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner left undisturbed. 
Finally, judgment was properly entered in favor of Attorney 
Gardiner as the undisputed evidence established that he was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Appellants1 
claims against him. The undisputed evidence established that the 
"wrongful acts" asserted by Appellants against Attorney Gardiner, 
during his limited representation of the DeBrys, were typical of 
the procedural wrangling that is expected in our adversary system. 
In fact, our procedural rules anticipate that these types of 
disputes will arise during the course of litigation and those rules 
provide for the resolution of disputes involving procedural conduct 
of the type Attorney Gardiner purportedly undertook. Moreover, as 
a matter of law, those remedies (e.g., sanctions under rules 11 and 
37) are the exclusive remedies and preclude the bringing of a 
subseguent, collateral action based solely on purported procedural 
12 
improprieties. In sum, Attorney Gardiner's actions in connection 
with his limited representation of the DeBrys do not give rise to 
any of the several causes of action asserted against Attorney 
Gardiner by his former clients1 adversaries, the Appellants. 
Accordingly, the judgment entered in his favor must be affirmed• 
VI. ARGUMENTS. 
A. APPELLANTS' BRIEF SHOULD BE DISREGARDED OR STRICKEN BECAUSE OF 
THEIR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE AND THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF ATTORNEY 
GARDINER SHOULD BE SUMMARILY AFFIRMED. 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides in part as 
follows: 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant 
shall contain under appropriate headings. . .: 
(7) A statement of the case. . . . A statement of 
the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements of fact and 
references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance 
with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, with citations to 
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this 
Rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically 
arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, 
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on 
motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess 
attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
Utah R. App. Proc. 24(a) & (j). 
Appellants1 Brief utterly fails to comply with this Rule. They do 
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not set forth the facts relevant to the determination of the 
numerous, vague and almost unintelligible issues they claim are 
raised by this appeal. Likewise, many of the facts they purport to 
set forth are argumentative conclusions, unintelligible, and not 
supported by the record. Moreover, to the extent Appellants 
purport to cite to the record, those cites are nothing more than 
references to entire pleadings without reference to any particular 
page or paragraph. Each of these Rule 24 deficiencies not only 
wastes the Courtfs time, it seriously jeopardizes Attorney 
Gardiner fs ability to respond and the Court should summarily affirm 
the trial courtfs judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner. E.g., 
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("We have 
routinely refused to consider arguments which do not include a 
statement of the facts properly supported by citations to the 
record.")(citations omitted); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 601 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992)(summarily affirmed lower court where brief 
failed to set forth a coherent statement of issues or standard of 
review for each issue); Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 612-613 
(Utah 1987)(do not reach merits where facts not set forth in brief 
with citations to the record); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950, 970 n. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(courts will disregard 
improper briefs as they cannot afford the effort and time to 
prepare appellant1 s case when the time can be better spent 
considering properly presented cases). 
The argument portion of the Appellants1 brief also fails to 
comply with Rule 24. It contains neither the contentions nor 
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reasons behind the Appellants1 arguments with respect to the issues 
presented. Moreover, Appellants fail to reference or cite to the 
record in connection with the legal authorities they claim are 
applicable, nor do Appellants provide any meaningful analysis. 
Instead, they choose to simply string cite numerous authorities 
without any analysis whatsoever. These defects also require that 
the Court disregard Appellants1 brief and summarily affirm the 
lower court's judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner. E.g., State 
v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (brief disregarded 
where analysis is not meaningful); Steele v. Board of Review of 
Indus. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(Court granted 
motion to strike where argument section of brief failed to provided 
citations to parts of the record relied on therein); Yates, 834 
P. 2d at 601 (brief disregarded where no meaningful analysis 
provided); English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 618-619 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991)(declined to address issue where legal analysis 
not meaningful). As this Court has noted, "[e]xtensive citations 
from numerous case authorities and treatises, while helpful, cannot 
substitute for the development of appellate arguments explicitly 
tied to the record before us." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In sum, it appears as though the Appellants' deficient brief 
in this case is very similar to the brief submitted in the Price 
case, wherein the Court wrote the following: 
We find [appellant's] brief clearly deficient under 
the provisions of Rule 24. The brief fails to set forth 
a coherent statement of issues and the appropriate 
standard of review for each issue with supporting 
15 
authority. The "issues" which are listed do not 
correlate with the substance of the brief. [Appellant's] 
statement of the case not only omits reference to the 
course of proceedings and disposition in the trial court, 
but fails to provide a statement of the relevant facts 
properly documented by citations to the record. 
TAppellant'sl "argument" does not identify any error by 
the trial court, refer to the facts or the record, or 
cite applicable authority, much less provide any 
meaningful factual or legal analysis. 
. . . [W]e do expect [appellant1s] brief to intelligibly 
present the issues on appeal. rAppellant1s] brief does 
not enable us to locate errors in the record or 
demonstrate "under applicable authorities" why the errors 
necessitate reversal. Therefore, we affirm the trial 
courtfs denial of [appellant's] motion to suppress. 
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(citations 
omitted and emphases added). 
As in Price, this Court should summarily affirm the lower court's 
ruling for Appellants' blatant failure to comply with numerous, 
critical provisions of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules pf Appellate 
Procedure.5 
B. APPELLANTS' UNTIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL FAILED TO VEST 
JURISDICTION IN THIS COURT AND THE APPEAL SHOULD BE SUMMARILY 
DISMISSED. 
On July 10, 1995 the trial court entered its Order dismissing 
all claims against all defendants, including Attorney Gardiner, 
with the exception of Valley Mortgage. Also on July 10, 1995 the 
Court entered its Order disposing of the claims against Valley 
Mortgage by continuing the trial on those claims H[p]rovided that 
5
 Appellants, in their Reply Brief, may seek to cure some 
of the numerous defects in their Brief. That should not be 
allowed, however, as Attorney Gardiner would not have an 
opportunity to respond and be heard. Moreover, that is not 
properly allowed in a reply brief under the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 24(c). 
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[Appellants] proceed with the filing of appeal of the Court's final 
Order of April 26, 1995, concerning dismissal and summary judgments 
granted to specific named defendants." These Orders effectively 
disposed of all issues in this case and therefore constitute final 
orders. Indeed, the July 10, 1995 Order on the Valley Mortgage 
i 
matter expressly referred to the other Orders as "final" Orders and 
further directed the plaintiffs, now Appellants, to proceed with 
the filing of an appeal of those decisions.6 
Pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Appellants were reguired to file a Notice of Appeal 
within 30 days of the entry of the final Orders entered on July 10, 
1995, or by August 9, 1995. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). This they 
failed to do. Their Notice of Appeal was not filed until October 
27, 1995, more than 100 days after the Orders were entered. 
[Record 3588-3590]. 
Once the trial court has entered an order that effectively 
disposes of all the claims, any previously entered orders that were 
not final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
become final. Sepia Enters., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 462 F.2d 115 
(6th Cir. 1972); Sandidge v. Salen Offshore Drilling Co., 764 F.2d 
252 (5th Cir. 1985). 
It is not necessary that all claims be dealt with on the 
merits if it is clear that no further action will be taken in the 
6
 That Order referencing the other Orders as "final" and 
directing the parties to proceed with filing the appeal was 
approved as to form by the Appellants, either pro se or through 
counsel, as indicated by their signatures thereon. 
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trial court on the remaining claims. See Holcomb v. Allis Chalmers 
Corp., 774 F.2d 398 (10th Cir. 1985)(Where cross claims would die 
from their own weight once main claim decided on merits, judgment 
on main claim is final without Rule 54(b) certification.); General 
Time Corp. v. Padua Alarm Sys., 199 F.2d 351 (2d Cir. 
1952)(abandonment of remaining claims makes adjudication of other 
claims a final judgment without Rule 54(b) certification). The 
July 10, 1995 Orders entered by the trial court effectively 
disposed of all claims in the court and they were therefore final 
Orders. 
Appellants1 filing of a Notice of Appeal significantly more 
than 30 days after the entry of those Orders was untimely and, as 
a matter of law, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal. E.g. , Utah R. App. P. 4(a); State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 
676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (time for filing an appeal is 
jurisdictional); Glezos v. Frontier Inv./ 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995)(court lacked jurisdiction to consider cross-appeal that 
was not timely filed). Accordingly, this appeal should be 
dismissed and the judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner should not 
be disturbed. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF ATTORNEY 
GARDINER ON EACH OF THE EIGHT (8) CAUSES OF ACTION ASSERTED 
AGAINST HIM IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
Summary judgment is proper, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. E.g. , Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Burns v. Cannondale 
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Bicycle Co. , 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), In connection 
with a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56(e) sets forth the 
following obligations of a nonmoving party: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e)(emphases added). 
Moreover, as this Court has noted, when a party "fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case . . . there can be no genuine issue 
as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'" Burns, 876 P.2d 
at 419-20 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 
(1986)). 
In response to Attorney Gardiner's motion for summary judgment 
which was supported by sworn affidavits and other admissible 
evidence, Appellants utterly failed to point with specificity to 
any contrary evidence to establish that there were any issues of 
material fact in dispute, or which support the conclusory 
allegations of their unverified complaint.7 Indeed, in light of 
7
 The vast majority of record citations contained in 
Appellants' response to Attorney Gardiner's motion for summary 
judgment were simply references to the entire record of the 
Underlying Litigation. That is improper. E.g., Brown v. Reardon, 
770 F.2d 869, 909 (10th Cir. 1985)(A party is reguired to allege 
the facts he claims are in dispute and point with specificity to 
affidavits or other evidence in the record that supports his 
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Appellants1 failure to produce proper supporting evidentiary 
material, the judgment granted in favor of Attorney Gardiner was 
proper and must be affirmed. E.g., Franklin Fin, v. New Empire 
Dev. Co. . 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983); Schafir v. Harriqan, 879 P.2d 
1384, 1391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (summary judgment affirmed where 
party failed to rebut evidence established by party moving for 
summary judgment); TS 1 Partnership v. All red. 877 P. 2d 156, 158 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)(MRule 56 requires that the adverse party to 
the summary judgment motion must respond, by affidavit or 
otherwise, in such a manner as to set forth a genuine issue of 
material fact for trial. The adverse party may not rest on mere 
allegation.11 Wciting Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp.r 836 P.2d 797, 
804 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). 
Appellants1 Consolidated Amended Complaint asserted thirty-two 
(32) causes of action against the various defendants. The 
following eight (8) causes of action were asserted against Attorney 
Gardiner: 
Fifth Cause of Action: Abuse of Process 
Tenth Cause of Action: Conspiracy 
Eleventh Cause of Action: Interference 
Twelfth Cause of Action: Civil Extortion/Coercion 
Twenty Second Cause of Action: Negligence 
Twenty Third Cause of Action: Abuse of Process 
Twenty Fourth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress 
Thirty Second Cause of Action: Consequential Damages 
These causes of action as they pertain to Attorney Gardiner are 
addressed in turn. 
contention that the facts are, in reality, disputed.w The court 
will not "find the proverbial needle in a paper haystack.11). 
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1. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF 
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS' FIFTH AND TWENTY-SECOND 
CAUSES OF ACTION FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS. 
The centerpiece of Appellants' lawsuit against Attorney 
Gardiner is the abuse of process claim,8 If this claim fails, all 
of the claims brought by Appellants against Attorney Gardiner fall 
like a house of cards. The abuse of process claim fails as it 
lacks both a legal and factual basis, requiring the affirmance of 
the judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner. 
To defeat Attorney Gardiner%s motion to dismiss and for 
summary judgment on their abuse of process claim, Appellants were 
required to plead and provide record evidence of the following: 
1) Attorney Gardiner used the legal process against 
Appellants for an improper purpose (i.e., to 
accomplish a purpose other than the purpose for 
which the process was designed); 
2) Appellants were damaged thereby; and 
3) The underlying proceedings terminated in favor of 
the Appellants. 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)(emphasis added); Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 30 Utah 2d 
451, 519 P.2d 888, 890 (1974); Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§§ 674(b), 682 (1976). 
Appellants1 claim fails as the undisputed evidence shows that the 
underlying proceedings were not terminated in favor of the 
Appellants and, moreover, Attorney Gardinerfs use of process was 
not improper. 
8
 Appellants1 Amended Complaint asserts two causes of 
action for abuse of process (the fifth and twenty-third causes of 
action). The causes of action are redundant and, therefore, this 
Brief's discussion of the abuse of process "claim" actually 
pertains to both of Appellants1 abuse of process claims. 
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a) Appellants1 Abuse Of Process Claim Fails As The 
Underlying Lawsuit Did Not Terminate In Their Favor, 
An abuse of process claim requires that the underlying 
proceedings terminated in favor of the party who subsequently 
brings the abuse of process claim. As a matter of law, Appellants1 
abuse of process claim must fail as they clearly were not the 
prevailing party of the underlying action. 
The abuse of process allegations made by the Appellants, more 
fully discussed below, assert that Attorney Gardiner and other 
Appellees abused the process in connection with the Underlying 
Lawsuit. The express terms of the Judgment in the Underlying 
Lawsuit provide, however, that Appellants were not prevailing 
parties. At page 14 of the 1991 Judgment, Judge Brian expressly 
indicated that "There is no prevailing party" and each party was to 
bear its own attorneys fees and costs.9 [Record 2918-2932 at p. 
14]. That finding by Judge Brian in 1991, which was not disturbed 
by the Utah Supreme Court on appeal,10 was entirely consistent with 
the undisputed evidence that the DeBrys were awarded judgment 
against, inter alia, the Appellants based on their faulty 
construction of the office building. [Jd. at p. 4]. Moreover, 
9
 This ruling by Judge Brian that no attorney's fees or 
costs should be imposed has particular significance. Since Judge 
Brian had specific statutory authority to impose attorneys1 fees 
sanctions had he determined that the action was improperly filed or 
pursued, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, and he chose not to do so, 
this Court should be reluctant to second guess his decision through 
a collateral action. 
10
 The Supreme Court refused to rule on the issue because 
Appellants failed to raise the issue below. DeBry v. Cascade 
Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1364 (Utah 1994). 
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Judge Brian's finding was entirely consistent with the fact that 
the Appellants and Appellee DeBrys entered into a settlement on a 
major aspect of the Underlying Lawsuit in February, 1990 — after 
Attorney Gardiner's forced withdrawal. 
Finally, it should be noted that on appeal the Utah Supreme 
Court specifically found that the Appellants did not prove the 
elements of either an action for fraud or an action for conspiracy 
to defraud, and therefore vacated the punitive damage award against 
the DeBrys. DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah 
1994). Accordingly, the trial court's 1991 Judgment that there 
were no prevailing parties, coupled with a major settlement 
effected after Attorney Gardiner's withdrawal and the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision affirming major relief in favor of the DeBrys 
against Appellants preclude any finding that Appellants were the 
"prevailing party" and their abuse of process claim must fail as a 
matter of law. 
b) Appellants' Abuse Of Process Claim Also Fails As The 
Undisputed Evidence Conclusively Establishes That 
Attorney Gardiner Represented The DeBrys Only During A 
Narrow Window And The Wrongs Alleged Against Him 
Constitute Nothing More Than A Zealous Representation Of 
His Client And Were Not Improper. 
Appellants did not, and could not, counter the evidence 
that Attorney Gardiner's participation in the Federal Lawsuit and 
the Underlying Lawsuit was anything but properly pursued and aimed 
at obtaining a proper adjudication of the disputes between the 
parties. Thus, judgment was properly granted in favor of Attorney 
Gardiner because based on the undisputed evidence the "improper 
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purpose" element of the abuse of process claim could not be 
satisfied. 
1) Attorney Gardiner's Actions In Connection With The 
Federal Lawsuit Were Proper. 
The undisputed record evidence establishes that 
Attorney Gardiner fs only involvement in the Federal Lawsuit was the 
successful defense of a Motion to Dismiss that had been brought 
against his clients, the DeBrys, and his appearance at a subsequent 
scheduling conference on July 31, 1989. [Record 2851-2852 at ff 
10-12; 2894-2898 at ff 5-9]. Attorney Gardiner did not 
participate in either the drafting or filing of the Federal Lawsuit 
against the Appellants, nor is there any allegation that he did so. 
[Record 2851 at f 10; 2894-2898 at f 5; 2726-2805]. The Federal 
District Court denied Appellants1 motion to dismiss the federal 
civil rights claims in the Federal Lawsuit which was opposed by 
Attorney Gardiner.11 [Record 2852 at Jf 11-12; 2899-2900]. The 
Appellants cannot successfully assert that Attorney Gardiner's 
conduct in connection with the Federal Lawsuit was improper or done 
with an improper purpose when his clients prevailed on the only 
motion in which he was involved.12 
11
 Attorney Gardiner did stipulate to the dismissal of the 
related state claims, not because they were frivolous, but because 
they were already pending in the Underlying Lawsuit. Accordingly, 
the District Court did dismiss those related state claims without 
prejudice. [Record 2894-2898 at 1 7; 2899-2910]. 
12
 Moreover, the eventual dismissal of the Federal Lawsuit 
resulted from the fact the state court had litigated the issues and 
that judgment was res judicata. There was never any substantive 
adjudication or determination of the DeBry's claims by the Federal 
Court. 
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2) Appellants1 Allegations That Attorney Gardiner 
Refused To Allow Re-Cross Examination Of Mrs. DeBry 
Do Not Constitute Abuse Of Process. 
Appellants attempt to bootstrap Attorney Gardiner's 
refusal to allow another deposition of Mrs. DeBry after the 
discovery cut-off into an abuse of process claim. That argument 
simply fails as a matter of law. Appellants1 allegations regarding 
Mrs. DeBry!s deposition are as follows: 
139. That deposition of Joan DeBry was called for by 
defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company in 
1990 before the main trial. 
140. That Joan DeBry appeared at the deposition and 
answered questions as directed by Lynn McMurray, counsel 
for Fidelity. 
141. That [Appellant] Del K. Bartel attempted to examine 
Joan DeBry based upon her prior responses, but was 
precluded from doing so by Dale Gardiner, the DeBrys 
counsel of record. 
142. That the DeBrys failure to allow examination, 
through the actions of their attorney, served to 
frustrate the regular conduct of these discovery 
procedures and constitutes abuse of process. 
The Court should note that a motion to compel would have 
immediately addressed the "due process deprivation" asserted by 
Appellants. Appellants also could object to the use of the 
deposition at trial should the eventuality arise. Yet Appellants 
did not raise the matter before the court in the Underlying 
Litigation. Appellants' failure to raise the issue in the trial 
court forecloses their right to raise the issue in a subsequent, 
collateral action.13 Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 
13
 Indeed, Appellant Del Bartel understood the importance 
and availability of the remedy in the trial court when he stated 
that he would allow the court to decide the dispute when not 
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120, 123 (Utah 1994)(exclusive redress for procedural defect is to 
raise the issue in the court where it arose, not in subsequent 
lawsuit); see also Barnard v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188, 1189 (10th 
Cir. 1983)(proper remedy for overly broad subpoena is motion to 
quash, not subsequent civil rights action); Rincrwood v. Foreign 
Auto Work, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah Ct. App.)(res judicata 
bars relitigation of issues that were presented in first suit or 
could and should have been raised in the first action), cert, 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Even if the Appellants could properly base a subsequent 
lawsuit on this discovery dispute, Attorney Gardiner's refusal to 
allow Appellants to again re-cross examine Mrs. DeBry does not rise 
to the level of egregious conduct needed in an abuse of process 
action. The undisputed evidences establishes that the Appellants 
had already taken and completed their deposition of Mrs. DeBry.14 
Moreover, the deposition about which Appellants complain occurred 
after the discovery cut-off and was an accommodation made by 
Attorney Gardiner. 
Based on the foregoing, judgment was properly granted in favor 
of Attorney Gardiner on Appellants1 abuse of process claim based on 
his refusal to allow the re-cross examination of Mrs. DeBry by the 
Appellants. 
allowed to re-cross examine Mrs. Debry. [Record 2958-2964]. 
14
 Counsel for the Appellants, Mark Larsen, completed his 
deposition of Mrs. DeBry on August 18, 1988 by stating ffThat is all 
I have." [Record 2881-3884]. 
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3) Appellants1 Claim That Attorney Gardiner 
Unsuccessfully Attempted To Recuse Judge Brian Is 
Not Abuse Of Process. 
Regarding the attempt to recuse and disqualify Judge 
Brian, Appellants1 unverified Amended Complaint alleges: 
188. In an attempt to postpone the 1989 trial date and 
obtain an extension of time to get expert witnesses back 
in the action, DeBrys unsuccessfully attempted to recuse 
Judge Brian. 
As set forth more fully above, the Appellants had a full and 
complete remedy available to them in the event they deemed any 
attempt to recuse Judge Brian as improper, i.e., a Rule 11 motion. 
Indeed, the Appellants filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions which 
was denied by Judge Daniels, the judge who ruled on the motion to 
disqualify. In fact, Judge Daniels, in his contemporaneous denial 
of Rule 11 sanctions, expressly found that there was a sufficient 
basis for bringing the motion. [Record 2894-2898 at 113]. The 
Appellants thereafter made no attempt to appeal the denial of Rule 
11 sanctions either on an interlocutory basis or after the final 
judgment was rendered. Therefore, any subsequent claims such as 
Appellants1 abuse of process claim and other claims based on 
similar allegations are res judicata. E.g., Thayne, 874 P.2d 120, 
123 (Utah 1994); Barnard, 720 F.2d at 1189; Ringwood, 786 P.2d at 
1357. 
4) Attorney Gardiner's Forced Withdrawal As Counsel 
For The DeBrys Does Not And Cannot Constitute Abuse 
Of Process. 
Appellants1 next attempt to assert an abuse of 
process claim against Attorney Gardiner involves the reasons for 
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which he withdrew as counsel for the DeBrys in the lawsuit. The 
Amended Complaint alleges as follows: 
189. DeBryfs second tactic to postpone trial involved 
the withdrawal of Dale Gardiner as counsel of record, 
that withdrawal being denied by the court. 
190. That after having failed to recuse Judge Brian and 
to effect Dale Gardiner's withdrawal, the DeBrys 
successfully called for postponement of the trial, citing 
a conflict of interest between Robert DeBry and Joan 
DeBry based upon their pending divorce. 
191. That after postponement of trial in 1989, the 
DeBrys unaccountably effected the resolution of any 
conflict that previously existed and they proceeded to 
trials in February 1990 and May 1990 in this litigation 
with common representation. 
During the pendency of the Underlying Lawsuit, Joan DeBry 
filed divorce proceedings against Robert DeBry. This created an 
obvious conflict as to the issue of the potential liability of one 
party for the actions of the other, i.e., both Robert and Joan were 
co-plaintiffs and counter-defendants in the Underlying Lawsuit. 
This conflict of interest was brought to the trial court's 
attention on July 19, 1989, at which time the trial court held in 
abeyance Attorney Gardiner's motion to withdraw pending efforts by 
the DeBrys to settle the conflict. [Record 2865-2866]. At that 
hearing, Mrs. DeBry's divorce lawyer made an appearance and 
confirmed the reality of the conflict. [Id.]. Judge Brian then 
stated that if the DeBry's did not resolve their conflict of 
interest by August 30, 1989, he would approve Attorney Gardiner's 
withdrawal as counsel. [Id.]. 
As of August 31, 1989, no settlement had been reached. As a 
result, Judge Brian approved Gardiner's withdrawal as counsel for 
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the DeBrys due to a conflict of interest. [Record 2885-2888]. 
Thus, Attorney Gardiner withdrew, and quit his employment with 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates. 
The DeBrys subsequently divorced and due to a stipulation 
entered into in connection with the divorce wherein Robert DeBry 
agreed to indemnify Joan, the DeBrys were able to proceed with 
common representation. [Record 2851 at f 9; 2866; 2889-2993]. 
The uncontroverted evidence establishes that this conflict was 
genuine and therefore, as a matter of law, Attorney Gardiner is 
entitled to judgment on Appellants1 abuse of process claim. 
5) Appellants1 Allegations Regarding Attorney 
Gardinerfs "Hiding, Losing and Destroying" 
Documents Did Not Create An Abuse Of Process. 
Finally, Appellants1 made an unsupported allegation that 
Attorney Gardiner destroyed, hid or lost documents sought in 
discovery. Appellants did not submit any evidence in support of 
their allegation and, moreover, there is none. The undisputed 
evidence establishes that Attorney Gardiner produced all documents 
provided to him, [Record 3408-3411 at f 3; 3422-3424] ,15 and 
Attorney Gardiner contemporaneously confirmed that fact to 
Appellants. [Record 3425]. Finally, this type of perceived 
procedural wrong should have been resolved by a motion to compel 
pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It does 
not rise to an abuse of process claim and, as a matter of law, 
15
 Moreover, the undisputed evidence establishes that all 
relevant documents were produced by the DeBrys to Attorney 
Gardiner, who in turn provided them to Appellants. [Record 3422-
3424; 3408-3411 at 5 3]. 
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cannot serve as the basis for a subsequent, collateral action. 
E.g. , Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 123 (Utah 
1994)(exclusive redress for procedural defect is to raise the issue 
in the court where it arose, not in subsequent lawsuit); Barnard 
v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188, 1189 (10th Cir. 1983)(proper remedy for 
overly broad subpoena is motion to quash, not subsequent civil 
rights action); Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Work, Inc., 786 P.2d 
1350, 1357 (Utah Ct. App.)(res judicata bars relitigation of issues 
that were presented in first suit or could and should have been 
raised in the first action), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1990). Thus, the judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner on the 
abuse of process claim should be affirmed. 
c. Appellants1 Abuse of Process Claim Based On Purported 
Procedural Improprieties Cannot, As A Matter Of Law, Be 
Pursued In A Collateral Action And Attorney Gardiner Is 
Entitled To Judgment In His Favor. 
Each of the "wrongful acts" which purportedly serve as 
the basis for the abuse of process claim against Attorney Gardiner 
is typical of the procedural wrangling that is expected in our 
adversary system. In fact, the procedural rules anticipate that 
these types of disputes will arise during the course of litigation 
between procedural adversaries, and a process for their resolution 
is provided. Under the rules, the acts performed by Attorney 
Gardiner are specifically authorized so long as the constraints of 
Rules 11 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are observed. 
In the event those bounds are believed to have been crossed, 
summary remedy is provided — in the very action where the 
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violation is suspected, before the trial judge fully versed in the 
facts, circumstances and prior conduct of both parties and who is 
best suited to judge the bona fides of the procedural posture 
taken. Should a violation be found, a full panoply of remedies is 
available in the trial court including summary resolution of the 
violation, attorney fees, and sanctions if appropriate. Should a 
litigant fail to avail himself of those remedies or fail to perfect 
an appeal if denied, he cannot pursue redress for those alleged 
procedural improprieties in a collateral action. Thayne, 874 P.2d 
at 123; Barnard, 720 F.2d at 1189; Ringwood, 786 P.2d at 1357. 
Accordingly, judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner on Appellants1 
claims, all of which are based on perceived procedural 
irregularities, was proper and should be affirmed. 
2. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF 
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS1 "CONSPIRACY" (TENTHS 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The undisputed evidence establishes that Attorney 
Gardiner was entitled to summary judgment on Appellants' 
"conspiracy" claim. To defeat Attorney Gardiner's motion on their 
civil conspiracy claim, Appellants were required to allege and cite 
record evidence to prove the following: (1) a combination of two 
or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of 
the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more 
unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result 
thereof. E.g., Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987Hciting Citizen State Bank v. Gilmore, 603 P.2d 
605 (Kan. 1979)). 
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Appellants1 Amended Complaint alleges that Attorney Gardiner's 
participation with Robert J. DeBry & Associates and the DeBrys in 
the action set forth in paragraph 267 (a) through (j) constitute a 
conspiracy. Appellants further allege "that these acts constitute 
negligence, abuse of process, malicious prosection, violation of 
civil rights, fraud upon the court, [and] intentional and gross 
misconduct at trial." [Record 2726-2805 at f 268]. 
The undisputed evidence submitted by Attorney Gardiner and 
which was unrefuted by Appellants establishes that, with respect to 
each of Appellants1 allegations, Attorney Gardiner either had no 
involvement or his actions were lawful.16 As a matter of law, if 
the object of the alleged conspiracy or the means used to attain it 
were lawful, there can be no civil action for conspiracy even if 
the plaintiff suffers damages and even if the defendant did act 
with a malicious motive. Israel, 746 P.2d at 792. 
The undisputed evidence establishes, with regard to each 
specific allegation contained in paragraph 267 of the Consolidated 
Amended Complaint, the following: 
(a) The undisputed evidence establishes Attorney Gardiner did 
not work with a private detective to obtain Appellants1 
16
 Appellants failed to show that there was any agreement 
between any of the parties or a meeting of the minds on the object 
or course of action of the conspiracy. This lack of evidence can 
be seen by the fact that Appellants1 Consolidated Amended Complaint 
filed nearly three years after the initial complaint still 
contained general, vague allegations and, in fact, failed to allege 
any agreement at all. Instead, the Complaint asserts that there 
was simply a "participation" between the parties. Moreover, 
Appellants did not submit any evidence to support this cause of 
action in opposition to Attorney Gardinerfs Motion to 
Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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personal and confidential information in violation of a court 
order. [Record 2898-2898 at Jll; 3408-3411 at 5 6]. 
(b) The undisputed evidence and prior court rulings establish 
Attorney Gardiner did not wrongfully expand or protract 
litigation as more fully discussed supra, at pp. 23-30, 
Moreover, Appellants failure to seek a timely remedy of any 
alleged misconduct is res judicata. E.g., Thayne v. 
Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 123 (Utah 1994); 
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Work, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
(c) The undisputed evidence and prior court rulings establish 
Attorney Gardiner did not prosecute any groundless companion 
cases. More specifically, his limited involvement in the 
Federal Lawsuit entailed only his successful defense of a 
motion to dismiss and a scheduling conference. Clearly, given 
his victory on the motion to dismiss his participation cannot 
be deemed groundless. 
(d) The undisputed evidence establishes Attorney Gardiner did 
not participate in hiding allegations that the DeBrys caused 
28 different contractors to make defective modification to the 
building. [Record 2898-2898 at 111]. To the extent this 
allegation is a restatement of the Appellants1 fraud claim on 
which the Supreme Court ruled against Appellants, that ruling 
is res judicata. 
(e) The undisputed evidence establishes Attorney Gardiner did 
not withhold any discovery from Appellants, [Record 3408-3411 
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at 5 3; 3422-3424; 3425], and Appellants1 failure to seek a 
timely remedy is res judicata. E.g. , Thayne, 874 P. 2d at 123; 
Ringwood, 786 P.2d at 1357. 
(f) The undisputed evidence establishes Attorney Gardiner was 
not involved in the alleged "escalating litigation in regard 
to engineering defects that [Appellants] were not liable for." 
[Record 2898-2898 at 111]. Moreover, this allegation is 
simply a restatement of the fraud claim previously decided 
against Appellants by the Supreme Court. 
(g) The undisputed evidence and prior court rulings 
conclusively establish Attorney Gardiner simply pursued 
meritorious litigation on behalf of a client and, as a matter 
of law, such activity is lawful and there can be no civil 
action for conspiracy resulting from lawful conduct, even if 
the opposing party is incidentally damaged. E.g., Israel/ 746 
P.2d at 792. 
(h) The undisputed evidence and prior court rulings establish 
that Attorney Gardiner did not submit any meritless or 
frivolous motions to recuse and disqualify Judge Brian. In 
fact, Judge Daniels, in his contemporaneous denial of Rule 11 
sanctions, expressly found that there was a sufficient basis 
for bringing the motion. [Record 2894-2898 at 513]. That 
ruling, coupled with Appellants1 failure to seek a timely 
remedy by challenging the denial of Rule 11 sanctions, is res 
judicata. E.g. , Thayne, 874 P.2d at 123; Ringwood, 786 P.2d 
at 1357. 
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(i) There is no allegation that, while Attorney Gardiner was 
acting as the DeBry!s counsel, Appellants requested any 
information regarding whether a certificate of occupancy could 
have been obtained. To the extent Appellants are attempting 
to again interject a fraud claim, the same is barred as a 
result of the Supreme Court1s prior decision that there was no 
fraud proved in the Underlying Lawsuit. DeBry v. Cascade 
Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1994). 
(j) The undisputed evidence and prior court rulings establish 
that the Federal Lawsuit was not meritless. Moreover, 
Attorney Gardiner's short participation in that lawsuit cannot 
be deemed meritless as he successfully defeated a motion to 
dismiss made by the Appellants. 
As can be seen from the foregoing, the undisputed evidence 
establishes that with respect to each and every allegation Attorney 
Gardiner either did not participate in the acts complained of or 
his actions were entirely lawful. In either event the Appellants 
are barred as a matter of law from asserting this conspiracy claim 
and the lower court's judgment in Attorney Gardiner's favor should 
be affirmed. 
3. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF 
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS1 ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR "TORTIOUS CONDUCT, INTERFERENCE, AND PRIMA FACIE 
TORT." 
Appellants eleventh cause of action purports to state 
claims for "tortious conduct," "interference," and "prima facie 
tort." That cause of action, however, utterly fails to state the 
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elements of any recognizable cause of action. Moreover, it appears 
to be yet another attempt to plead what is essentially an abuse of 
process claim. The trial court's judgment in favor of Attorney 
Gardiner on this cause of action, therefore, was also proper on the 
bases set forth supra at section VI.C.l, pp. 21-31. 
4. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF 
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS! TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR CIVIL EXTORTION AND COERCION. 
Appellants1 allegations on this cause of action assert 
the wrongful use of the legal process "by manipulating, extending, 
and protracting the litigation" in order to extort or coerce 
Appellants to abandon legal rights and incur legal expenses. 
[Record 2726-2805 at 5f 284-296]. The term "extort" is legally 
defined as to "compel or coerce . . . or to gain by wrongful 
methods. . . or to obtain in an unlawful manner." Black's Law 
Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) at p. 525. Extortion on its face, 
therefore, presumes the use of improper means for an improper 
purpose. Appellants1 extortion/coercion cause of action, 
therefore, is just another attempt to assert the abuse of process 
claim which, as discussed supra at section VI.C.l, pp. 21-31, fails 
as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment entered in favor of 
Attorney Gardiner on this claim should be affirmed. 
5. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF 
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS1 TWENTY-SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
Appellants1 negligence claim against Attorney Gardiner 
alleges that he "knowingly," "willfully," "intentionally," and with 
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"knowledge" participated in various wrongful actions, and that he 
"negligently participated with the DeBrys in pursuing meritless 
litigation." [Record 2726-2805 at 5f 378-384]. Appellants further 
allege that as a result Attorney Gardiner "caused the [Appellants] 
to rely upon these false representations to [Appellants'] damage 
and detriment." [Id. at f 387]. Appellants have in substance 
alleged a fraud claim by pleading the key elements of intent, 
reliance and damages, but have attempted to mask this claim under 
the guise of negligence. The obvious purpose in doing so was to 
avoid the res judicata effect of the Supreme Court's express ruling 
on appeal that the Appellants' did not prove the elements of an 
action for fraud in the Underlying Lawsuit. DeBry, 879 P. 2d at 
1358.17 
In addition to the claim being barred under the doctrine of 
res judicata, the negligence claim also fails because, as a matter 
of law, Attorney Gardiner did not owe any duty to the Appellants, 
opposing parties in litigation. As the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has noted: 
Attorneys engaged in discharging their professional duties to 
their clients should not be held liable for negligence towards 
third persons because their paramount and exclusive duty is to 
their clients, and there is no room for the existence of a 
duty running to the adversary. 
Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979); see also Bird v. 
17
 Appellants1 allegations under this negligence cause of 
action also parallel the alleged misconduct purportedly giving rise 
to the abuse of process claim. Given that Attorney Gardiner is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the abuse of process 
claim, he is entitled to judgment on this negligence claim for the 
same reasons. 
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Rothman, 627 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (negligence is improper 
standard upon which to base liability of attorney to an adverse 
party given the adverse relation), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 865 
(1981). Absent a duty owing from an attorney to his adversaries, 
the negligence claim fails as a matter of law. For the foregoing 
reasons, the judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner on Appellants1 
negligence claim should be affirmed. 
6. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF 
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS1 TWENTY-FOURTH CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS. 
A claim for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress under Utah law requires proof that the defendant's alleged 
wrongdoing directly resulted in "severe" or "extreme" emotional 
distress. E.g., Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961); White 
v. Blackburn, 787 P. 2d 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Appellants 
neither plead nor produced any evidence that they suffered severe 
or extreme emotional distress. Appellants1 failure to allege an 
essential element of the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress is grounds for dismissal. Boisjolv v. Morton 
Thiokol, Inc., 706 F.Supp. 795, 801 (D. Utah 1988). 
Moreover, a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress requires that the defendant's actions constitute 
"outrageous conduct" which is "of such a nature as to be considered 
outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality" and that such 
conduct exceeded "all bounds of that usually tolerated in civilized 
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society." White, 787 P.2d at 1317, Again, there was no allegation 
or evidence to support Appellants1 claim.18 In fact, the 
undisputed evidence conclusively establishes that Attorney 
Gardinerfs limited involvement in the Underlying Litigation and 
Federal Lawsuit does not constitute the type of severely outrageous 
conduct Appellants must prove to prevail on this claim. E.g., 
Samms, 358 P.2d at 346-347; White, 787 P.2d at 1317-1318. 
Accordingly, judgment was properly granted in favor of Attorney 
Gardiner and that ruling should be affirmed. 
7. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF 
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS1 THIRTY-SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR "CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES." 
Appellants1 assert a separate cause of action for 
"consequential damages." This is not a cause of action under Utah 
law and was properly dismissed in favor of Attorney Gardiner. 
D. TO THE EXTENT THEY SEEK TO DO SO, APPELLANTS CANNOT PURSUE A 
CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM AGAINST ATTORNEY GARDINER AS HE WOULD BE 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON SUCH CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Appellants' Brief, which fails to comply with Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, purports to set forth some 
"argument" that Appellants have a "civil rights" claim. While 
Appellants do not appear to be asserting this claim against 
Attorney Gardiner, this Brief will set forth the reasons Appellants 
cannot prevail on this claim as a matter of law. 
18
 Appellants1 allegations are simply that Attorney Gardiner 
actively interfered with completion of the building; that he 
conspired with others to perpetuate fraud; and that he improperly 
used the legal process generally. [Record 2726-2805 at 5f 393-
400] . 
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As a preliminary matter, such a claim was clearly not pled as 
to Attorney Gardiner and, as a result, the claim should be 
dismissed. Moreover, even if the Appellants could, which they 
cannot, allege any facts to support such a claim, the claim must 
fail. In order to state a cause of action for a violation of civil 
rights, a plaintiff must show government action in the conduct 
complained of. Barnard v. Young. 720 F.2d 1188, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 
1983). The only arguable government action would be that Attorney 
Gardiner was a lawyer licensed by the State.19 That very argument, 
however, has been rejected by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals as 
they have ruled that such licensure does not provide the state 
action component of a civil rights claim. Barnard, 720 F.2d at 
1189 ("private attorneys, by virtue of being officers of the court, 
do not act under color of state law within the meaning of section 
1983")(citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981)). 
Accordingly, to the extent the "civil rights" claim is asserted 
against Attorney Gardiner, he is entitled to summary judgment on 
that claim. 
VII. RELIEF SOUGHT. 
Attorney Gardiner asks this Court to affirm the judgment 
entered by the July 10, 1995 Order of the Honorable Homer Wilkinson 
in favor of Attorney Gardiner dismissing with prejudice all causes 
19
 That Attorney Gardiner is forced to guess as to what 
Appellants are or might argue is necessitated by Appellants failure 
to comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The Appellants should not be rewarded for violating the Court's 
rules by having this unfair and undue hardship placed on Attorney 
Gardiner. 
40 
of action asserted against him. 
VIII. NO ADDENDUM IS NECESSARY. 
No addendum is necessary pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this S5"L daY o f January, 1997. 
ATKIN & LILJA, P.C. 
appellat.brf 
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